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The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility:
What Is “Hostile” to Religion Under the
Establishment Clause?
Frank S. Ravitch.∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the term “hostile” to describe the treatment of a
person, idea, or entity generally implies that there is some negative
intent or feeling involved—that is, that the treatment is actually
hostile. Yet when the United States Supreme Court has used that
term in connection with government entities’ treatment of religion,
the Court has failed to adequately explain what it means by
“hostility.”1 Recent decisions indicate the Court has presumed that
the failure of government entities to follow the dictates of formal
neutrality is sometimes hostile to religion,2 although the Court has
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. This Article is
based, in part, on a presentation given as part of the Association of American Law Schools
Section on Law and Religion panel at the Association’s annual meeting that took place in
Atlanta, Georgia, in January 2004. I am grateful for the comments and questions raised by my
fellow panelists Tom Berg, Fred Gedicks, Steve Gey, and Brett Scharffs, and for those raised by
members of the audience. Special thanks also go to Brett Scharffs for arranging and chairing
the panel.
1. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that the dissent “seemingly . . . reserve[s] special hostility for those who take their
religion seriously”—apparently because the dissent did not apply formal neutrality—but
without explaining further why this is hostility); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995) (explaining that the viewpoint discrimination under the
facts of the case “would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion,” without
explaining how viewpoint discrimination based on an erroneous interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, but not on antagonism toward religion, would risk fostering hostility as
opposed to bias against religion); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (noting
that “government may not be overtly hostile to religion,” without explaining what would
constitute such hostility).
2. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 (plurality opinion); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46;
cf. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248
(1990) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”). But see Locke
v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313–14 (2004) (holding that it is not hostile to religion to deny
funding for training as a minister under a generally applicable funding program).
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never seriously attempted to justify this characterization. The
Supreme Court’s use of the term in the Establishment Clause
context thus appears to be only rhetorical. If the Court uses a
powerful term such as “hostility,” however, it should do so only
when actual hostility is involved.
The Court’s rhetorical use of hostility is consistent with its recent
tendency toward formalism in religion clause analysis.3 The problem
is that the trend has led to a doctrine that is based on unstated
principles. Yet the Court attempts to substantiate this doctrine with
different concepts, such as “neutrality” and “hostility,” which are
mostly rhetorical. In several important contexts, the Court has begun
to use bright-line tests that seem to depart from earlier precedent but
derive significant support from concepts and terminology that the
Court never adequately justifies or explains.4
In cases such as Mitchell v. Helms,5 the Court uses the term
“hostility” without ever defining it or connecting it to hostile
motives. It seems the Court applies the label of “hostility” to justify a
result, but because the Court applies it to situations that may have
little to do with “hostility” as commonly understood, the Court’s
rhetoric may turn into a blunt instrument to cast even mildly
separationist doctrine and policies as hostile—and thus violative of
the Court’s new formal neutrality principle. This has an Alice-inWonderland-like impact, as Justices use the term “hostility” in
situations where there is no hostility, and then, based on that term,
find that the government action is not neutral, when the Court’s

3. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a voucher
program in which more than ninety-six percent of tuition vouchers went to religious schools,
where the bulk of the seats were available to voucher students, because the program was
facially neutral and allowed parents to “choose” where to send their children); Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 793 (plurality opinion) (holding that facial neutrality is the primary test for judging the
constitutionality of a government program through which equipment was lent to schools,
including religious schools); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that
exemptions to laws of “general applicability” are not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause).
But see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (applying the less formalistic
endorsement, coercion, and Lemon tests to hold prayer at public high school football games
unconstitutional).
4. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 490–513 (2004)
(criticizing the Court’s shift to a formalistic neutrality approach in Establishment Clause cases
and asserting that the Court utterly fails to explain how its approach is neutral or how
neutrality can exist in religion clause disputes).
5. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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neutrality concept has little to do with neutrality, if neutrality is even
possible in this context.6 Interestingly, the Court’s use of hostility in
its most recent funding decision, Locke v. Davey,7 suggests a limit to
this trend, but the Court’s brief discussion of hostility in that case
seems to conflict with the use of the same concept in other cases.
Significantly, this Article is not an entry in the long-standing
debate over whether separationism and/or secularism are biased
against religion.8 While I disagree with those in the debate who
automatically equate bias or bad effects with hostility toward
religion, this article is not an attempt to either defend or refute the
role of separationist principles in the Establishment Clause context.
It does, however, suggest that those who equate separationism with
bias against religion should stick with the concept of bias (whatever
its merits across issues) and use the concept of hostility only when
there is evidence of actual hostility as discussed below. Part II of this
Article will provide background on the Court’s use of the concept of
hostility and some of the concerns raised by the Court’s approach.
Part III will analyze the Court’s use of hostility under the
Establishment Clause and suggest that the Court has moved toward
equating separationist motives with hostility. While this connection
may be accurate in some limited contexts, the Court has not
seriously attempted to explain it. Part IV will assert that hostility
toward religion is a real concern that needs to be addressed but that
the lack of formal neutrality is not adequate proof of this hostility.

6. I have argued that it is not. See generally Ravitch, supra note 4.
7. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). Locke will be discussed in greater detail in the next section
of this Article. See infra pp. 1036–38.
8. I would suggest that in some contexts they are. For a discussion of this debate, see,
for example, PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (discussing
the history of separation and suggesting that separationism has historically been connected to
hostility toward religion); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Univ. N.C. Press, rev. ed. 1994) (discussing the history of
separation and its role in protecting religion and religious freedom); Douglas Laycock, The
Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667 (2003) (reviewing Hamburger’s book
and suggesting that Hamburger oversimplifies the justifications for separation)); see also, Steven
K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality
and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1117–25 (2002) (addressing the relationship
between neutrality and separation and further addressing various views of separation).
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II. BACKGROUND
In recent years the Court has used the concept of hostility
toward religion primarily in cases involving equal access,9 but the
concept is also finding its way into the government aid context.10 In
both these realms, the Court (or a plurality of Justices) has in essence
said that failure to treat religious entities and individuals like all other
entities and individuals is hostile toward religion. Thus, the Court
seems poised to treat hostility and lack of formal neutrality11 as two
sides of the same coin.
I have argued elsewhere that the current Court’s notion of
formal neutrality is an empty concept because neutrality does not
and cannot exist, at least not in the Establishment Clause context.12
In contrast, hostility toward religion can exist, and thus, it is a
different kind of concept than neutrality: whereas neutrality makes an
untenable universal claim,13 hostility does not. Of course, the fact

9. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–
46 (1995) (ruling that a university cannot deny funding to a religious student newspaper if it
allows other non-school-sponsored student groups and publications access to such funding);
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (upholding the Equal Access Act, which requires that public secondary
schools give religious, political, and other groups access to meet at school facilities if other
non-curriculum-related student groups are given access).
10. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 (suggesting that the exclusion of religious
schools from a government program that provided loaned equipment to qualifying schools is
hostile to religion).
11. Formal neutrality requires that there be facial neutrality of government action—the
government cannot intentionally favor or discriminate against religion or a specific religion. In
the context of government aid—financial or otherwise—there must also be private choice,
which requires that the aid flows literally or figuratively through the hands of private
individuals before reaching a religious institution or organization. See Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–53 (2002).
12. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 498–513; see also STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 96
(1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE] (“The foregoing discussion suggests
that the quest for neutrality, despite its understandable appeal and the tenacity with which it
has been pursued, is an attempt to grasp at an illusion.”); Steven D. Smith, Symbols,
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test,
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 316 (1987) (“[O]ur attempts to say what neutrality means turn out to
be indeterminate and deeply ambiguous.”).
13. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 498–513 (suggesting that the concept of neutrality makes
an inherent universal claim); cf. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 12, at 97 (“The
impossibility of a truly ‘neutral’ theory of religious freedom is analogous to the impossibility,
recognized by modern philosophers, of finding some outside Archimedean point . . . from
which to look down on and describe reality.”).
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that hostility can exist does not mean that the Court’s use of the
concept is accurate—this Article argues that it is not. Inaccuracy in
the use of the term “hostility” was less problematic in earlier
decisions in which the Court did not connect the term to formal
neutrality, although a strong argument can be made that earlier
Courts did not take hostility toward religion as seriously as they took
religious favoritism.14 Still, the Court has long held that “hostility”
toward religion is prohibited by the First Amendment.15 Yet the
Court has done a poor job of defining “hostility” and the current
Court’s choice of definition has little to do with real hostility.16 Since
“hostility” has generally served as a tangential rhetorical justification
for decisions, this concern has been little explored.
This is not simply a debate over semantics because terms such as
“hostility” and “neutrality” represent concepts (however poorly
defined) that the Court uses to justify its decisions. If the Court’s
“hostility” is not hostile and its “neutrality” is not neutral, the
Court’s approach must rest on some other footing. By failing to
define and explain that footing, the Court forces those who question
its approach to spar with shadows.
The oft-cited argument that the Court has simply chosen a
baseline for neutrality does not solve the problem because there is no
neutral place from which to create that baseline.17 Thus, even though
hostility toward religion can be real, the Court’s evolving concept of
hostility is problematic because the Court’s apparent baseline for
hostility is the lack of neutrality, which itself has no adequate
14. This has been reflected in a great deal of scholarship that has suggested that
liberalism (or secularism) is hostile to religion when it attempts to keep public discourse and
public life primarily secular. See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion,
American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 268–70, 298, 300–03 (1992); Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 671–74, 678–86, 693–96
(1992). I agree with these authors that a pervasive favoring of secular principles in all public
contexts can be biased against (some would say for) religion, but while such bias may be
unconstitutional in some circumstances, it is not generally based on hostility. See infra Parts
III–IV.
15. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“We agree of course
that the State may not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing
or showing hostility to religion . . . .”).
16. Of course, the same could be said of the Court’s earlier definitions, but it is the
potency of the concept when combined with formal neutrality that makes the current Court’s
experimentation with the concept troubling. See infra notes 18–42 and accompanying text.
17. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 493–94; see also Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of
Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 319–24 (1990) (critiquing the argument that neutrality
requires a baseline and rejecting neutrality as an empty ideal).
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baseline. Using a concept that itself has no adequate baseline as a
baseline for hostility simply removes the problem by one degree; it
does not solve it.
Recent cases supply examples of the Court’s subtle but forceful
use of the concept of hostility in the Establishment Clause context.
The Court’s use of the concept seems to be evolving (or devolving)
over time. In Mitchell v. Helms,18 a case involving a government
program that lent educational equipment to public and private
schools, including religious schools, a plurality of the Court held:
The pervasively sectarian recipient has not received any special
favor, and it is most bizarre that the Court would, as the dissent
seemingly does, reserve special hostility for those who take their
religion seriously, who think that their religion should affect the
whole of their lives, or who make the mistake of being effective in
transmitting their views to children.19

The plurality simply assumed that the position of the
respondents and the dissenting Justices in Mitchell reserved “special
hostility for those who take their religion seriously,” without
identifying any actual government hostility to religion.20 There are,
of course, many possible reasons for the position taken by the
respondents and the dissenting Justices short of hostility. It is one
thing to challenge a doctrine—based on that doctrine’s history—that
was born of actual hostility toward a religion,21 but quite another to
assert that those who adhere to a doctrine do so out of “special
hostility” when that doctrine has evolved over the years to serve
other purposes.
More recently, in Locke v. Davey,22 the Court suggested that not
every government decision to deny funding based on the religious
interests of funding recipients is hostile to religion. In Locke, the
Court held that the State of Washington could deny funding under a

18. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
19. Id. at 827–28 (plurality opinion). The plurality later noted the abominable, but
sadly effective, anti-Catholic influence on the opposition to funding sectarian schools from the
late eighteen hundreds to more recent times—a true example of hostility toward religion (or a
specific religion). Id. at 828–29 (plurality opinion). For further discussion of this animus, see
infra notes 61–71 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 827–28 (plurality opinion).
21. For an interesting, but highly critical, discussion of the history and evolution of
separationist doctrine, see HAMBURGER, supra note 8.
22. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
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facially neutral scholarship program to a student who planned to use
that funding for ministerial training.23 The state denied the funding
because to provide it would have violated the state constitution’s
equivalent of the Establishment Clause, a clause that is broader than
its federal counterpart.24 The state did allow students under the
program to use the scholarships at any accredited college or
university, including religious institutions.25 Thus, the state only
precluded funding for training in devotional theology. Joshua Davey
asserted that the denial of funding violated his rights under the Free
Exercise Clause. The Court noted the tension between the two
religion clauses in such cases but held both that there is some “play
in the joints” between the two clauses and that a state decision not
to fund training for the clergy fell within this play.26 The holding was
limited to training in devotional theology and thus did not address
the broader question of whether a state could deny funding to
religious institutions generally under a facially neutral funding
program.
Interestingly, the Locke Court used the term “hostility” several
times in the opinion.27 For example, the Court noted: “That a State
would deal differently with religious education for the ministry than
with education for other callings is . . . not evidence of hostility
toward religion.”28 The Court also noted that the fact that the state
allowed the scholarships to be used at religious institutions, so long
as the student is not training for the clergy, supports the argument
that the denial of the scholarship in Davey’s case was not evidence of
hostility.29 It is important to note that the Locke Court seemed to
23. Id. at 1309.
24. Id. at 1312.
25. Id. at 1310.
26. Id. at 1311–12, 1315.
27. Id. at 1313–14.
28. Id. at 1313.
29. Id. at 1314–15. It is interesting that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Locke,
which Justice Thomas joins, accuses the state of discriminating against religion, id. at 1319–20
(Scalia, J., dissenting), but does not use the term “hostility” in a context relevant to this
Article. Justice Scalia does use the term in an unrelated context. See id. at 1316 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“One can concede the Framers’ hostility to funding the clergy specifically . . . .”).
Justice Scalia is clear that such discrimination need not be the product of animus in order to be
problematic. Id. at 1318–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This might simply be a result of the
parameters of the Locke case itself, or it could reflect an intentional decision to use more precise
concepts in addressing the disadvantaging of religion or religious perspectives. This Article
suggests, infra Parts III–IV, that focusing on discrimination rather than hostility would be a
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connect hostility with animus, as this article suggests is appropriate,30
although the Court was not clear about this. Yet it is hard to gel the
Court’s approach to the concept of hostility in Locke with its use of
that concept in cases like Mitchell, Rosenberger, and Mergens, none of
which involved proof of animus toward religion.31 If Locke signals a
move toward defining “hostility” in some concrete way that has
something to do with actual hostility, this would be a welcomed
development. This is unlikely, however, given the limited context
and holding in Locke and the Court’s general failure to define the
concept in other recent cases.
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School.32 and Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,33 the Court held that
the refusal to allow religious organizations to use public-school
property for meetings and the denial of funding for a religious
student publication, respectively, were viewpoint discrimination.
Neither of these cases is exceptional in the free-speech context as
there is ample support for the notion that the exclusion of religious
entities from a public or limited public forum is content and/or
viewpoint discrimination,34 although both cases applied that concept
to situations not addressed in prior opinions.35
positive step because it is possible to engage in disparate treatment based on establishment or
other concerns without being hostile toward religion. Yet both Justices Scalia and Thomas
were members of the Mitchell plurality and have used the ill-defined concept of hostility
elsewhere, so it is unlikely that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Locke signals an intent to
abandon the hostility concept in other contexts.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text; infra notes 33–42 and accompanying
text.
32. 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (ruling that a Christian group focused on children in an
elementary school must be given access to a school building for meetings if other noncurriculum-related student groups are given access).
33. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a university cannot deny funding to a religious
student newspaper if it allows other non-school-sponsored student groups and publications
access to such funding).
34. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (holding that the exclusion of a church from using school facilities at night to show a
film was unconstitutional); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (ruling that a religious
student group is entitled to use university facilities that are open to other student groups).
35. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (applying a free-speech argument developed
in the secondary and postsecondary education context to prohibit the exclusion of an
elementary-school religious club from a common school building that included the elementary
school); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (applying the public-forum argument developed in
the government property context to a government funding program that provided funding for
student publications).
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Interestingly, in both cases the government entities asserted that
they were motivated by Establishment Clause (or related state law)
concerns; the Court, however, treated their actions as hostile to
religion.36 In each case the Court cited Board of Education of
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens,37 in which the
plurality held, “if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities
open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but
hostility toward religion.”38 The Mergens plurality, quoting Justice
Brennan’s concurring opinion in McDaniel v. Paty,39 further defined
what it meant by “hostility”:
The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat
religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their
status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore
subject to unique disabilities.40

The Mergens plurality seems to have assumed that the exclusion
of a religious student club would constitute such a governmentimposed disability and, at least implicitly, that such would be the
intent. Yet, there are many possible reasons for such treatment that
have nothing to do with hostility toward religion.41
It is important to note that the Court has not used the concept
of hostility in all of its recent Establishment Clause decisions. The
decisions in which it has used that concept, however, suggest that it
is poised to use its rhetorical hostility in tandem with the doctrine of

36. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.
37. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
38. Id. at 248 (plurality opinion).
39. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
40. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
41. I would add that even though excluding the group may not have been hostile, it
could, and should, be found unconstitutional regardless of the Equal Access Act. The reason
for this lies in the Free Speech Clause, however. If government creates a public or limited
public forum and denies access to religious groups while allowing other groups to meet,
government places religion at an unfair disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas. See generally,
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that a
school district could not make its building available to groups discussing family issues from a
variety of perspectives and deny access only to those wishing to discuss such issues from a
religious perspective). As I have argued elsewhere, however, there are important reasons for
limiting this analysis to the Equal Access context. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 524, 526–28, 530–
31, 570–71.
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formal neutrality that it has developed in recent decisions;42 thus, the
concept may come to occupy an important place in the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING
DEFINITION OF HOSTILITY
In the recent cases where the Court has referred to “hostility,”
the Court may be suggesting that the effect of separationist policy is
hostile to religion—that is, separationist policy has a disparate impact
that negatively affects religion or a specific religion. While this is
perhaps accurate, it is ironic, since the Court refused to consider the
impact of the programs in question when defining “neutrality” in
cases where policies had a positive impact on religion.43 Is it possible
that the Court will not consider the impact of government actions
when those actions give religion, especially more dominant religions,
a substantial benefit44 and yet will consider the impact when the
government attempts to prevent such disparate negative results?45
Still another possibility is that the Court has equated disparate
treatment with hostility.46 This too is problematic because
government entities engaged in disparate treatment, and parties who
advocate for such treatment in Establishment Clause cases, may be
motivated by many concerns that do not involve hostility toward
42. Compare the Court’s analysis of effects in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002), with the plurality’s use of hostility in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000)
(plurality opinion). But see Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313–14 (2004) (holding the
denial of state funding to a student pursuing a devotional-theology degree constitutional, even
under a formally neutral program, but limiting the holding to training in devotional theology).
43. See e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; see id. at 687–88, 695–708 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Court glossed over the impact of the voucher program, which could not
have been upheld if the Court had seriously looked at its effects); see also Ravitch, supra note 4,
at 513–16, 520–23 (suggesting that the Zelman Court has taken any serious analysis of the
effects of government programs out of the “effects test”).
44. See Ravitch, supra note 4, at 513–23 (suggesting that the impact of the program
upheld in Zelman was to provide a substantial benefit to religion, especially to larger sects with
established religious schools or the means of, and interest in, establishing such schools).
45. Implicit in the Court’s holding in Zelman is the possibility that the neutrality principle
will be violated if religious organizations or individuals are denied access to open government
funding programs, even if the reason for the denial is a concern that religious entities will
receive a disproportionate benefit if such access is granted. But see Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307
(holding that a state has the ability to deny access to funding for training as a minister under an
otherwise available government scholarship program).
46. This is apparently what a plurality of the court did in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28
(2000) (plurality opinion).

1040

5RAV-FIN

1031

10/13/2004 7:36 PM

Rhetorical Hostility

religion.47 In fact, in some cases they may be motivated by a belief
that such treatment protects religion or that it recognizes religion’s
special place in our constitutional system.48 Whether such assertions
are accurate or not, they do not evince hostility toward religion.49
Given that earlier Courts recognized valid reasons for treating
religion differently, even “less favorably” in some contexts, the
current Court’s evolving notion of hostility may be quite different
from that of earlier Courts.
If the Court’s implication of hostility relates only to the negative
effects of the government action in aid and equal-access cases, rather
than actual hostility on the part of government actors, the Court has
created an interesting Establishment Clause doctrine indeed. The
Court will overlook massive disparate favoritism of dominant
religions (especially in the aid context),50 yet easily overturn
government action that has the effect of disfavoring religion.51 If, on
the other hand, the Court is relying on the idea that government
entities are singling out religion for unfavorable treatment, then it
needs to explain why that treatment is problematic in light of the
Court’s earlier decisions that relied on separationist principles.
Ironically, the Court uses the concepts of neutrality and hostility to

47. The biggest concerns may be: (1) fidelity to constitutional values, which until
recently had a more separationist bent, see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 102–05 (2001); id. at 131–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that when a school district
denied access to a religious club due to concerns that the club would engage in religious
instruction and proselytization, the district’s motivation seemed to be compliance with state
law and Establishment Clause concerns); and (2) an intent to protect religion from the
“impurity” of government, a concern that some have traced to Roger Williams, see LEVY, supra
note 8, at 183–85.
48. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (holding that religious liberty can
best be achieved by “a government . . . stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to
assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group”);
see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948) (holding the
same); LEVY, supra note 8, at 183–85 (noting the same).
49. See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a city
voucher program that ultimately sent millions of dollars in tuition to local religious schools—
94.6% of voucher students attended religious schools—and such schools were primarily of only
one or two denominations).
51. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). But
see Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) (suggesting that an exception to this approach
exists when a state denies funding for training as a minister, but not clarifying whether the
exception goes beyond such limited circumstances).
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avoid doing so. The separationist approach, as used in some
contexts, might be wrong, but it is not inherently hostile.
The Rehnquist Court is certainly not the first to use the concept
of hostility to describe the exclusion of religious entities from broad
programs, but it is the first to place such immense faith in the
concept of formal neutrality. It is the combination of the Court’s use
of formal neutrality and the potential expansion of the Court’s use of
hostility to undermine separation-driven arguments without directly
confronting them that makes the Rehnquist Court’s recent use of
hostility troubling. It is not that modern separationist arguments or
motivations are inherently correct, but rather that calling them
hostile to religion, and dismissing them as a result, demonstrates a
complete lack of legal or intellectual rigor and tells us nothing about
the merits of those arguments. The Court’s use of the term in Locke
may be a step in the right direction because the Court appears to
equate hostility with animus, but as was already explained, Locke is
unclear about this and may be quite limited because of the facts
involved.52
So what does the Court’s evolving use of the concept of hostility
tell us about the meaning of that term in the Establishment Clause
context? First, it seems that hostile motives are certainly not a
requirement for a finding that something is hostile toward religion.
Second, much of what earlier Courts said about the Establishment
Clause and its meaning—i.e., favoring a separationist approach53—
now apparently falls under the rubric of hostility toward religion.54
Some scholars have long equated strong separationism with
hostility,55 and the current Court apparently agrees. Yet, did those

52. See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text.
53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (developing a test for Establishment
Clause cases based heavily on separationist principles); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211 (using
Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of “a wall of separation between church and state” to interpret
the Establishment Clause); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
54. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(holding that treating religion differently in the context of government aid programs manifests
hostility toward religion); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (denying government funds to a
student newspaper under a generally open funding program because the paper’s proselytizing
message is viewpoint discrimination, and Establishment Clause concerns are not adequate to
justify such viewpoint discrimination).
55. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 124–25 (1992); see also Gedicks, supra note 14, at 671, 674, 693–94
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who opposed the aid in Mitchell, or the officials at the University of
Virginia in Rosenberger, act out of hostility toward religion, out of
respect for the First Amendment, out of concern for some entirely
different reason, or out of concern for some combination of these
reasons? If the argument is simply that a facial distinction between
religious and other entities is inherently hostile toward religion,
using the term “hostility” seems to add little more than a rhetorical
justification.
IV. ACTUAL HOSTILITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Court’s failure to adequately define its notion of hostility
does not mean that hostility toward religion does not exist. The
question is how “hostility” should be defined under the
Establishment Clause. Should purpose, effect, or both, be relevant to
this question? The answer matters because the Court has been
relatively consistent in holding that government cannot discourage
religion without violating the Establishment Clause (although it has
been quite lax in defining what would discourage religion).56
Scholars have also argued that discouragement of religion, not just
encouragement, can violate the Establishment Clause.57 Of course,
the question remains as to what constitutes hostility, what
constitutes discouragement, and whether the two are the same thing.
This section asserts that hostility is a form of discouragement, but
that discouragement is a broader concept.
I am generally suspicious of placing a great deal of weight in a
dictionary when defining terms that have important legal meaning,
but the power and impact of the term “hostility” when used to
describe government action vis-à-vis religion suggests that the

(addressing hostility toward religion in U.S. Supreme Court opinions and American public
life).
56. For a good example of an older case suggesting this, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952). For a good example of a newer case suggesting the same, see Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 793 (plurality opinion).
57. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001–02 (1990) (“[T]he religion clauses require
government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious
belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance. . . . But I must
elaborate on what I mean by minimizing encouragement and discouragement. I mean that
religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be. It should proceed as
unaffected by government as possible.” (footnote omitted)); Ravitch, supra note 4, at 544–49
(arguing that religion should neither be facilitated nor discouraged by government).
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commonly understood meaning of that term—essentially hostile
intent or general antagonism—is the best starting place for a
workable definition under the Establishment Clause. When the
Court uses the term “hostility” to justify its reasoning, people may
draw on the commonly understood meaning of that term absent an
alternative definition, which, as noted above, the Court has not
provided.58 The Oxford Desk Dictionary defines “hostility” as (1)
“being hostile; enmity” and as (2) “acts of warfare.”59 It defines
“hostile” as (1) “of an enemy” and as (2) “unfriendly; opposed.”60
Obviously, “hostility” suggests hostile intent or, at the very least, an
antagonistic state of mind. This definition is consistent with the
general use and understanding of the term in society at large.
Therefore, when the Court uses the term “hostility” to describe
government action toward religion or a religious entity (or to
describe the position of the dissenting Justices), the implication is
that there is some hostile intent on the part of government or other
actors. As noted above, such intent may be entirely absent in the
contexts where the Court uses the term “hostility,” unless one is
willing to treat an intent to uphold perceived constitutional duties as
hostile toward religion61 or claim that disparate treatment not
motivated by hostile intent is hostile toward religion.62
To be considered “hostile toward religion,” a party’s actions
should involve some actual hostile intent or attitude toward religion
qua religion or toward a specific religious entity. There are some
obvious examples of this in recent Court decisions. For example, the
actions of the city of Hialeah in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah (a Free Exercise Clause case)63 are an excellent
example of actual hostility toward religion. The city set up a system
of ordinances that were designed to affect only Santerian animal
sacrifice.64 The city’s actions were taken against a backdrop of
professed enmity by some city residents, and even some city officials,

58. See supra notes 1, 3–6 and accompanying cases.
59. THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY, AMERICAN EDITION 271 (Laurence Urdang ed.
1995).
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
62. This is apparently what the Court has been doing. See supra notes 18–21, 32–41
and accompanying text.
63. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
64. Id. at 524–28.
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toward the Santeria faith and its practice of animal sacrifice.65 The
ordinances were found to violate the Free Exercise Clause because
they demonstrated discrimination against a particular religion,66 but
they might have also violated the Establishment Clause because the
city seemingly engaged in hostile action designed to discourage
religion (in this case a particular religion).67
The plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms provides another
example of actual hostility toward religion when it discussed the antiCatholic animus connected to the movement for Blaine
amendments—state constitutional provisions modeled after a failed
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would have banned
funding to religious schools.68 There is little doubt that the
movement behind these amendments, and at least some of the
motivation behind early separationism, was highly influenced by antiCatholic and, to a lesser extent, anti-ecclesiastical sentiment.69 At
that time, the so-called Blaine amendments were motivated, at least
in part, by hostility toward religion, and they were certainly designed
to discourage the growth of the Catholic-school movement,70 which
itself evolved in part as a response to the Protestant domination of
the common schools and ultimately the early public schools.71
Yet today there are other principles that may support the
substance of the so-called Blaine amendments and separationism
more generally.72 The motivations of state officials who currently
support such “no aid” amendments, and of parties who sue to

65. Id.
66. Id. passim.
67. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“[W]e find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its
weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”).
68. 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also HAMBURGER, supra note
8, at 321–28, 335–42 (explaining that both before and after Senator Blaine’s failed attempt to
amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit any government funding of religious schools, there
was a strong movement, heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animus, that agreed with Senator
Blaine’s proposal).
69. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 21 (recounting the evolution of the early
separationist movement and the activities of groups such as the anti-Catholic nativists).
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. See LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825–
1925, at 83–85 (1987); FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 5 (1999).
72. This can be seen in any number of articles defending the value of separationism. See,
e.g., Green, supra note 8.
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prevent government funding of religious entities, may have nothing
to do with enmity or hostility toward religion generally or a specific
religion.73 The Court’s rationale in Locke v. Davey supports this.
While the Court held that the state constitutional provision in
question was not a Blaine amendment,74 the Court acknowledged
that the state’s denial of funding for ministerial training was not
hostile toward religion.75 Given the definition of “hostility” above,
however, it is hard to understand why the same conclusion would
not apply to denials of funding or access in cases such as Mitchell and
Rosenberger, even if the denial is unconstitutional for other reasons.
Of course, the above examples demonstrate hostility toward a
specific religion or specific religions, but some have suggested that
separationism leads to a purging of religious views more generally,
and is thus hostile toward religion.76 The broader relationship
between religion and public life is complex and beyond the scope of
this Article, but despite my concern that strict separationism may be
unconstitutional and bad policy, it is not inherently hostile toward
religion. In fact, some of its strongest supporters have been
concerned with protecting religion.77
Thus, whether or not current separationist-oriented doctrines
and principles are proper interpretations of the Establishment Clause,
calling them hostile toward religion is nothing more than a rhetorical
slap or verbal barb. The Court and some scholars derive support and
power from using the term, but the term adds nothing of substance
to their arguments. Unless the government entity denying funding
or access or the party challenging government action demonstrates a
negative intent or attitude toward religion generally or a specific
religion, there is no proof of hostility toward religion. Disparate
treatment in this context does not equate to hostility because those

73.
74.
75.
76.

See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 912–13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 n.7 (2004).
Id. at 1313–14.
See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 106–23 (1993); Gedicks, supra note 14, at 674,
678–82, 693–96 (connecting the distinction between public and private aspects of religion in
cases and society at large to the broader liberal tradition). See generally NEUHAUS, supra note
55.
77. See Gaffney, supra note 14, at 302 (noting that leading separationist Leo Pfeffer was
not “in any real sense hostile to religion” and that in fact Pfeffer “is a devout Jew who is
convinced that religion will thrive—even that it can only thrive—when it does not enjoy the
benefit of government subsidies”).
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engaging in that treatment are often motivated by constitutional
concerns or concerns for avoiding divisiveness in the community,
rather than hostility toward religion.78
Moreover, in the absence of hostile intent, disparate impact must
be analyzed as an effect of government action, rather than as its
purpose. I strongly advocate an approach to the Establishment
Clause that takes effects seriously, whether those effects favor
religious entities or disfavor them.79 The Court, however, writes off
effects that seem to favor religion in cases like Zelman, yet puts great
weight in effects that seem to disfavor religion in cases like Mitchell
and Rosenberger.80 It is possible that the Court sees this apparent
conflict but does not view it as such, thus intending its doctrine to
require serious examination of effects when those effects harm
religious entities, but not when they favor such entities.81 However,
this remains unclear.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has not relied heavily on the concept of hostility in its
recent Establishment Clause decisions, but the concept has had an
impact. Given the Court’s recent focus on formal neutrality in a
number of contexts, such as government aid and equal access, the
concept of hostility may take on more importance. Because of its
narrow holding, Locke v. Davey does not clearly point in one
direction or the other with regard to the Court’s future use of the
hostility concept. When the Court has attempted to use the concept
of hostility in recent years, it has done so only in a rhetorical sense: it
presumes that the lack of formal neutrality is hostile toward religion.
Yet this is not an adequate or accurate definition of “hostility.”
78. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
79. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 544–73.
80. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a voucher
program in which 94.6% of voucher funds went to religious schools that represented only a few
denominations), with Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding
that exclusion of religious schools from a general government program supporting the loan of
educational equipment because the religious schools are “pervasively sectarian” reflects hostility
toward religion and is unconstitutional), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (suggesting that the exclusion of a religious student newspaper from
a general funding program would disfavor religious viewpoints and is therefore
unconstitutional).
81. This is consistent with the approach taken by some scholars. See, e.g., NEUHAUS,
supra note 55.
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Disparate impact and even disparate treatment (depending on the
motivation for that treatment) are not necessarily evidence of
hostility toward religion.
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